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[1181] 
Putting Names to Money: Closing Disclosure 
Loopholes 
 GIAN GUALCO-NELSON†  
Elections create an opportunity for voters to get to know the candidates, but elections also give 
voters the opportunity to get to know their fellow voters. Campaigns are obligated to disclose the 
identity of their donors, which can make these donors’ political affiliations known to the world. 
Also, the identity of a donor can adversely affect the recipient’s public image and potentially, the 
election. These disclosure requirements arguably enable stigmatizing candidates and fellow 
voters for their political ideology, but this is offset by the desire to make elections transparent.  
In today’s polarized society, the risk of stigma seems greater than in the past—imagine wearing 
a MAGA hat in San Francisco or an Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez shirt in rural Alabama—but it 
pales in comparison to the need for transparency in elections. After the 2016 Presidential 
Election, Democrats and Republicans alike claimed that nefarious actors attempted to influence 
the election: be it through foreign interference or election fraud. While there are some disclosure 
requirements that help mitigate such influence, the current requirements have several loopholes 
that actors use to remain anonymous. 
This Note evaluates three of these disclosure loopholes: (1) the 501(c) disclosure exemption for 
independent expenditures; (2) the internet loophole for certain electioneering communications; 
and (3) the straw-donor laundering loophole. Throughout this analysis, one theme stands out: the 
structure of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has crippled the agency’s ability to enforce 
disclosure laws. Absent unlikely assistance from Congress, the solution lies with the courts.  
Recent judicial decisions portend the possibility of meaningful judicial review of FEC inactions. 
While questions remain about whether FEC decisions based on “prosecutorial discretion” are 
exempt from judicial review, the Federal Election Commission Act gives the courts authority to 
review FEC decisions that are contrary to law. This Note concludes by arguing that FEC 
enforcement decisions are not exempt and should be nullified if they are “contrary to law.” 
 
 †  J.D. Candidate 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Editor-in-Chief, Hastings 
Law Journal. Thank you to Emily Tripodi, HLJ’s Executive Production Editor, who has spent countless hours 
scrutinizing footnotes and sources to ensure that the Hastings Law Journal publishes high-quality articles. Also, 
thank you to Andrea Butler and my family for providing a seemingly endless amount of love and support. 
Remaining errors are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1972 Presidential election, Maurice Stans served as Finance 
Chairman for President Richard Nixon’s Committee for the Reelection of the 
President.1 On August 1, 1972, the Washington Post reported that Stans received 
a $250,000 cash contribution from President Nixon’s reelection campaign, 
which was partially distributed to the Watergate burglars.2 In the wake of the 
Watergate Scandal, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA), in part, to strengthen disclosure requirements and prevent anonymous, 
or dark money, in elections.3 Dark money consists of donations from external 
donors whose identities are not publicly disclosed.4  
Despite these attempts at strengthening electoral transparency, since 1974, 
the three branches of government have compromised transparent elections. First, 
Congress lost the will to compel political donors to abide by disclosure laws. 
Incumbent congressional members largely benefit from loose campaign finance 
disclosure laws, and recent Supreme Court decisions have weakened statutory-
based disclosure requirements.5 Second, from Buckley v. Valeo to Citizens 
United v. FEC,6 the Supreme Court has lifted the gate on unlimited independent 
expenditures and muddled the differences between express and issue advocacy. 
Third, the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) duties have substantially 
changed in the wake of judicial precedents that reshaped the FEC’s 
interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act.7 More globally, the FEC’s 
enabling statute contains a design flaw that requires six appointments that are 
evenly split between Democrats and Republicans without any tiebreaker.8 The 
commission’s party-split has resulted in partisan deadlock, especially in light of 
increased political polarization.9  
 
 1. Maurice Stans; Nixon Cabinet Member, Campaign Scandal Figure, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 15, 1998, 12:00 
AM), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/apr/15/news/mn-39538.  
 2. See Reporting Group, Super PACs: How We Got Here, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2012, 6:46 AM), 
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2012/01/31/super-pacs-how-we-got-here/; The Watergate Story: Timeline, 
WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/watergate/timeline.html (last visited Apr. 
15, 2020). 
 3. See Reporting Group, supra note 2; see also Lesley Oelsner, Stans Pleads Guilty to Five Violations of 
Election Laws in Campaign of 1972, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/13/ 
archives/stans-pleads-guilty-to-five-violations-of-election-laws-in-campaign.html; Mark Stencel, The Reforms, 
WASH. POST (June 13, 1997), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/ 
legacy.htm. 
 4. See Dark Money Basics, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/basics (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2020). 
 5. See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.  
 6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 7. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.  
 8. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2)(A) (2018).  
 9. NBC’s investigative task force researched and created a database of past FEC decisions demonstrating 
that Democrat appointees vote in a party bloc 87% of the time and Republican appointees vote in a party bloc 
98% of the time. See Tisha Thompson, Troll Response Brain Sims, NBC WASH., 
https://www.nbcwashington.com/investigations/Deadlock-FEC-Commissioners-Say-Theyre-Failing-to-
Investigate-Campaign-Violations-394014971.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2019, 10:27 PM); see also Dave 
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This Note analyzes how the failure of the three branches, particularly the 
Executive, in enforcing electoral transparency have enabled three major 
loopholes in campaign finance disclosure laws: (1) 501(c) disclosure exemptions 
for independent expenditures; (2) internet loopholes for certain electioneering 
communications; and (3) the straw-donor laundering loophole. First, this Note 
will address the Center for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) v. 
FEC (“CREW I”) decision,10 which invalidated the FEC’s regulation exempting 
501(c) organizations from disclosing the identities of its donors. The 501(c) 
disclosure exemption is a weakness in campaign finance laws, and while 
CREW I deters efforts to funnel dark money into elections, there are still several 
schemes used to introduce anonymous and untraceable donations. This Note 
provides insights into how these gaps can be filled.  
Second, 501(c) entities are not subject to any disclaimer or disclosure 
requirements for certain electioneering communications published on the 
internet. Electioneering communications are public announcements or 
advertisements that discuss a potential candidate.11 This Note argues that the 
FEC should fill this loophole by amending its definition of “electioneering 
communications” to include “public communications.”  
Third, this Note analyzes the straw-donor laundering scheme. Many 
wealthy donors will create an LLC (“straw donor”) to funnel contributions to 
super PACS and 501(c) organizations. This practice allows donors to remain 
anonymous, avoid disclosure requirements, and exceed contribution limits. The 
Campaign Legal Center, a non-profit that works to promote transparency in 
politics, filed several complaints with the FEC alleging straw-donor violations; 
however, the FEC chose not to investigate these complaints.12 This trend appears 
throughout this Note: the FEC repeatedly chooses not to investigate dangerous 
loopholes that threaten transparency, which then forces the courts to step in and 
prod the FEC into action. Courts should review the FEC’s decision not to 
investigate under the “contrary to law” standard, but recently, the FEC claimed 
that decisions based on “prosecutorial discretion” are not subject to judicial 
review. And in CREW v. FEC (“CREW II”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit agreed.13 CREW II has generated division within the D.C. Circuit 
among judges who believe that FEC decisions based on prosecutorial discretion 
 
Levinthal, Another Massive Problem with U.S. Democracy: The FEC is Broken, ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/another-massive-problem-with-us-democracy-the-fec-is-
broken/282404/; Ann M. Ravel, Dysfunction and Deadlock at the Federal Election Commission, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/dysfunction-and-deadlock-at-the-federal-
election-commission.html. 
 10. 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 11. Making Electioneering Communications, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-
candidates-and-committees/other-filers/making-electioneering-communications/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).  
 12. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 119 (D.D.C. 2017).  
 13. CREW v. FEC (CREW II), 892 F.3d 434 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Then-Judge Kavanaugh voted in favor of 
the opinion, which indicates how he will vote if this issue reaches the Supreme Court. Id. 
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are subject to judicial review.14 Decisions like CREW v. American Action 
Network (“AAN”) narrowly construe CREW II so that judicial review still applies 
to pretextual uses of “prosecutorial discretion” as a talisman for decisions of law.  
I.  THE 501(C) PROBLEM  
In the 2016 Presidential Election, candidates and outside groups raised over 
$2.4 billion.15 Outside groups for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump raised over 
forty percent as much cash as their political committees.16 Beyond the immense 
amount of money spent, there is a question as to what and who make up these 
outside groups.  
Outside groups include political action committees (PACs), political party 
committees, super PACs, and 501(c) “dark money” organizations.17 A political 
party committee represents the political party associated with the candidate, such 
as the Democratic National Committee or Republican National Committee.18 
PACs are committees established by the candidate but not authorized by the 
candidate to accept contributions or make expenditures.19 PACs directly 
contribute to a candidate’s campaign, whereas super PACs do not.20 Super PACs 
may only make independent expenditures as opposed to direct contributions.21 
In 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that contribution limits on independent 
expenditure-only groups violated the First Amendment, thereby giving birth to 
super PACs.22 Unlike “dark money organizations,” a super PAC must disclose 
each of its donors because super PACs spend strictly to influence the outcome 
of elections.23  
The most controversial of these outside groups are “dark money” 
organizations.24 Dark money organizations are certain groups of donors that, 
 
 14. See Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. FEC (Democracy 21), 952 F.3d 352 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(Edwards, J., concurring); see also CREW v. American Action Network (AAN), 410 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 
2019).  
 15. 2016 Presidential Race, OPENSECRETS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16; Also-
Rans: 2016 Presidential Race, OPENSECRETS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/also-rans 
(encompassing all candidates who ran in the general and primary election).  
 16. 2016 Presidential Race, supra note 15. Hillary Clinton’s political committees raised $563,756,928 and 
outside groups raised $231,118,680. Donald Trump’s political committees raised $333,127,164 and outside 
groups raised $135,719,703. Id. 
 17. Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2020).  
 18. GREG J. SCOTT & ZAINAB S. SMITH, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 
CAMPAIGN GUIDE: POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES 1 (2013), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-
content/documents/partygui.pdf. 
 19. Types of Nonconnected PACs, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-
committees/registering-pac/types-nonconnected-pacs/.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  
 22. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 23. Kim Barker & Marian Wang, Super-PACs and Dark Money: ProPublica’s Guide to the New World of 
Campaign Finance, PROPUBLICA (July 11, 2011, 12:38 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/super-pacs-
propublicas-guide-to-the-new-world-of-campaign-finance.  
 24. Dark Money, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).  
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until recently, were exempt from several campaign finance disclosure 
requirements, which meant that they could spend an infinite amount of money 
on political campaigns without disclosing their donors.25 In the 2016 presidential 
election, dark money groups raised $181.78 million.26 In other words, the public 
received $181.78 million worth of election-related information distributed by 
people who could be anyone: a neighbor, a board of directors, an issue advocacy 
group, a Nazi sympathizer, or even a foreign national.  
Under 11 C.F.R. § 109.10, a 501(c) organization must disclose the identity 
of its contributors only if the contribution “was made for the purpose of 
furthering the reported independent expenditure.”27 This means that a business 
could be organized as a 501(c)(4) organization with an alleged social welfare 
purpose, like education, to avoid disclosure. A 501(c)(4) could then collect 
donations from employees of the business or other individuals who know the 
501(c)(4)’s true purpose (advocating for the business) without having to disclose 
the donors’ identities. Unless the contributor specifically earmarks the 
contribution for express advocacy,28 the 501(c)(4) would not be required to 
disclose the identity of the contributor.29  
Before CREW I, an entity could protect its donors’ identities through a 
surprisingly simple process.30 To avoid disclosure, the entity would first register 
with the Internal Revenue Service as a 501(c)(4),31 501(c)(5),32 or 501(c)(6) 
organization.33  
Theoretically, so long as 51% of the 501(c)(4)’s expenditures are reported 
for social welfare purposes, as opposed to “campaign activities,” the 
organization can continue to operate as 501(c)(4) and hide the identity of its 
donors.34 Politically active social welfare organizations often operate under 
“educational” purposes. For example, an educational purpose can include 
 
 25. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10 (2020).  
 26. Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ 
nonprof_summ.php?cycle=2018&type=type. 
 27. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10. 
 28. Such as a specific independent expenditure. 
 29. JOHN FRANCIS REILLY & BARBARA A. BRAIG ALLEN, POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AND LOBBYING 
ACTIVITIES OF IRC 501(C)(4), (C)(5), AND (C)(6) ORGANIZATIONS, at L-3 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopicl03.pdf. The regulation adopts the language in Buckley, where the Court first defined express 
advocacy. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976). The FEC considers any language using phrases such 
as “vote for the President,” “re-elect your Congressman,” “vote Pro-Life,” or “Nixon’s the one,” as examples of 
express advocacy for the election or defeat of a candidate. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (1995). Thus, unless individuals 
donate to a 501(c)(4) with the express purpose of funding an independent expenditure, 11 C.F.R. § 109.10 
permits a 501(c)(4) to serve as a shell to protect the identity of its individual donors. 
 30. 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 31. 26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2018) (defining these organizations as social welfare organizations dedicated to 
pursuing charitable, educational, or recreational ends). 
 32. § 501(c)(5) (defining these entities as labor unions).  
 33. § 501(c)(6) (defining these entities as trade associations including the American Bar Association, 
American Medical Association, and American Bankers Association). 
 34. See Richard Briffault, Super PACS, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1648–49 (2012); Miriam Galston, When 
Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of 
Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 876 (2011).  
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informing the public on certain ballot measures, political candidates, and other 
contentious issues.35  
The following example is illustrative. John Smith runs against incumbent 
Jane Node for the United States Senate. Jane benefits from longstanding 
financial supporters that have helped her win prior races. However, certain 
special interest groups, like pharmaceutical companies, do not like Jane Node’s 
policies. A pharmaceutical company approaches John to offer financial support 
for his candidacy. The company understands that its support might hurt John’s 
public image. Additionally, federal campaign finance laws cap 
individual/corporate contributions to campaigns at $2800, and this 
pharmaceutical company plans on contributing much more money.36 To 
anonymously contribute funds to John’s campaign without contribution caps, 
the pharmaceutical company hires a lawyer to create a 501(c)(4) social welfare 
organization called “Americans for Advanced Medicine” (AFAM). AFAM’s 
social welfare mission statement states that, “AFAM will work at the federal, 
state, and local level to mobilize patients to support legislation to help enable 
advances in medicine.” As a 501(c)(4), AFAM can engage in an unlimited 
amount of lobbying, provided that the lobbying serves AFAM’s social welfare 
mission.37 Under § 109.10, AFAM does not have to disclose the identity of its 
contributors, unless a contributor earmarks her contribution for a specific 
independent expenditure.38 Section 109.10 enables the pharmaceutical company 
to donate a large sum to AFAM, who then can spend that money on various 
independent expenditures, such as fliers, advertisements, and public outreach.  
Prior to CREW I, AFAM did not have to disclose the pharmaceutical 
companies’ identities because these companies did not expressly agree that the 
funds would be used for the specific independent expenditures (advertisement, 
fliers, commercials, etc.).39 However, in CREW I, the D.C. District Court 
directed the FEC to expose the human sponsors of dark money organizations.40 
However, donors—aided by the FEC’s structural deficiencies—have developed 
workarounds to avoid this disclosure mandate by using multiple 501(c) shell 
organizations to preserve anonymity, exploiting weak internet disclosure laws 
that do not cover certain electioneering communications, and donating through 
LLCs that protect shareholder identities.  
  
 
 35. See Dark Money Basics, supra note 4.  
 36. Contribution Limits: Contribution Limits for 2019-2020 Federal Elections, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 37. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(vi) (2020). 
 38. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.10; 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9). 
 39.  CREW v. FEC (CREW I), 316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 422 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 40. Id. 
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A. ADDRESSING THE 501(C) PROBLEM IN INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES: 
CREW I 
In CREW I, CREW brought suit against the FEC and Crossroads 
Grassroots Policy Strategies, a 501(c)(4) organization.41 Initially, CREW filed 
an administrative complaint against Crossroads alleging that Crossroads 
accepted a $3 million contribution to support its work, without disclosing the 
contribution in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C).42 The statute states that 
“[s]tatements required to be filed by this subsection . . . shall include . . . the 
identification of each person who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the 
person filing such statement which was made for the purpose of furthering an 
independent expenditure.”43  
The FEC dismissed CREW’s complaint, relying on 11 C.F.R. section 
109.10(e)(1)(vi), which states that a 501(c) must disclose “[t]he identification of 
each person who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the person filing such 
report, which contribution was made for the purpose of furthering the reported 
independent expenditure.”44 The FEC’s reading of § 109.10 narrowed FECA by 
requiring a 501(c) organization to disclose the identity of its contributors who 
donated for the purpose of furthering “the reported” independent expenditure, as 
opposed to “an” independent expenditure.45  
Crossroads and the FEC maintained that § 109.10 only compelled 
Crossroads to disclose the identity of its donor if the donor specifically 
contributed to Crossroads for a specific independent expenditure, as opposed to 
independent expenditures generally.46 The district court disagreed and struck 
down the FEC’s regulation, holding that FECA requires 501(c) organizations to 
disclose the identity of individuals contributing to further independent 
expenditures that expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate for 
federal office, without regard to whether the donor contributed to fund a specific 
independent expenditure.47  
The court applied Chevron’s first step and determined 
that § 109.10(e)(1)(vi) conflicted with FECA’s unambiguous language.48 FECA 
specifically states that a group must disclose a donor’s identity where the 
contribution is “made for the purpose of furthering an independent 
expenditure.”49 The court held that “‘an independent expenditure’ means . . . an 
unspecified one.”50 The defendants argued that the statute was ambiguous—
specifically that the use of “an independent expenditure” begs the question 
 
 41. Id. at 364.  
 42. Id. at 357–59. 
 43. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 44. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(vi) (emphasis added). 
 45. Id.  
 46. CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 390–91. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 50. CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 390.  
GUALCO-NELSON-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:46 PM 
May 2020] CLOSING DISCLOSURE LOOPHOLES 1189 
“which [independent expenditure]?”51 However, the court noted that “an” is an 
intentionally indefinite word that is not designed to be limited in scope.52 If 
Congress wanted a narrower scope, it could have used the challenged 
regulation’s language, like “the reported independent expenditure” as opposed 
to “an independent expenditure.”53 The court determined that indefinite words 
such as “an” can be used to intentionally and unambiguously provide an 
indefinite scope.54 In doing so, the court found that the FEC’s regulatory 
language directly conflicted with FECA’s statutory language. The court 
invalidated the FEC’s regulation and ordered the FEC to provide disclosure 
guidance in light of the court’s decision.  
The district court’s decision regarding the use of “an” was a correct 
interpretation of FECA. Even Crossroads conceded that the definition of “an” 
depended on the context.55 Moreover, the district court relied on the proposition 
that, when applying the first step of Chevron, generality does not necessarily 
indicate ambiguity.56 However, in its motion to stay, Crossroads argued that the 
D.C. Circuit rejected a similar construction of general terms, such as “an,” by 
relying on legislative history and congressional inaction.57  
Crossroads’s argument suggested that it wanted the D.C. Circuit to focus 
primarily on Chevron step one. However, in response to Crossroads’s 
application for an emergency stay pending appeal, the D.C. Circuit rejected 
Crossroads’s Chevron step one argument as resting on “(debatable) legislative 
history and post-enactment congressional inaction.”58 The court cited multiple 
Supreme Court decisions that declined to resort to legislative history when a 
statute contained clear language.59 The court also relied on Supreme Court 
decisions that declined to consider congressional acquiescence in the absence of 
ambiguous language.60 Although Crossroads had a higher burden of proof given 
the emergency stay posture, even on appeal it is unlikely that the D.C. Circuit 
will accept Crossroads’s Chevron argument.  
CREW I is burdensome for agencies and 501(c) organizations, but the 
decision is critical for political transparency. CREW I will force the FEC to 
develop intricate regulations to manage the influx of donor identification 
 
 51. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 403–04.  
 55. Id. at 404. 
 56. Id. at 405 (citing Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2000) (rejecting the 
approach to Chevron step one analysis that “confuses generality for ambiguity”). 
 57. See Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion for a Stay 
Pending Appeal at 4–5, CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.C.C. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-00259-BAH). 
 58. CREW v. FEC, 904 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
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disclosures.61 Though 501(c) organizations will have to make new and 
significant disclosures,62 this burden does not outweigh the value of political 
transparency. Even the Supreme Court has affirmed that “transparency enables 
the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different 
speakers and messages.”63  
Crossroads is one of many politically motivated nonprofits that utilized the 
FEC’s § 109.10 regulatory loophole to avoid disclosures—spending nearly $71 
million on independent expenditures in the two years post Citizens United.64 
Section 109.10 substantially interfered with transparency, and given that 
disclosure is arguably the “least restrictive means” of dealing with dark money 
in campaigns, courts are likely to support disclosure requirements.65 In fact, in 
response to Crossroads’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit cited Justice Kennedy’s quote in Citizens United when it concluded that 
the “the interest in anonymity does not, for purposes of an exceptional stay, 
outweigh [CREW I] . . . and the public’s countervailing interests in receiving 
important voting information and in transparency.”66 This suggests that it is 
unlikely that Crossroads’s arguments will succeed on appeal to the D.C. Circuit.  
However, Crossroads may find support from the United State Supreme 
Court. On September 15, 2018, Crossroads successfully petitioned a stay from 
Chief Justice Roberts.67 Three days later, the Supreme Court vacated Chief 
Justice Roberts’ stay.68 Both the stay and order to vacate lack any reasoning, 
which makes it difficult to glean anything from the Court’s back and forth. 
Some scholars speculate that the Court may hear the decision if the D.C. 
Circuit upholds the district court’s.69 Given some of the conservative Justices’ 
hostility towards campaign finance disclosure laws, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that the Court may reverse a decision affirming the district court’s 
 
 61. Federal Election Commission’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 35, CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 
3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 62. Id.  
 63. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010). 
 64. FEC MUR 6596 (Crossroads GPS), Statement of Reasons of Vice Chairman Matthew S. Petersen and 
Commissioner Caroline C. Hunter at 4 (May 13, 2019), https://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/6596_2.pdf. 
 65. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (“[D]isclosure requirements certainly in most applications 
appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress 
found to exist.”). 
 66. CREW v. FEC, 904 F.3d 1014, 1019 (2018). 
 67. Order, Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. CREW, 139 S. Ct. 5 (2018).  
 68. Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. CREW, 139 S. Ct. 50 (2018). 
 69. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee & Roberts Barnes, Political Nonprofits Must Now Name Many of Their 
Donors Under Ruling After Supreme Court Declines to Intervene, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2018, 6:55 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-political-nonprofits-donors-20180918-story.html; Dave 
Levinthal & Sarah Kleiner, Supreme Court Lets Stand a Decision Requiring “Dark Money” Disclosure, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/supreme-court-lets-stand-a-
decision-requiring-dark-money-disclosure/570670/; Tim L. Peckinpaugh et al. “Dark Money” Gets a Little 
Light: CREW v. FEC and Its Implications for the 2018 Midterms, K&L GATES (Sept. 26, 2018), 
http://www.klgates.com/dark-money-gets-a-little-light-crew-v-fec-and-its-implications-for-the-2018-
midterms-09-26-2018/. 
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decision. After all, in Citizens United, Justice Thomas authored a dissenting 
opinion that argued that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA) 
disclosure requirements were unconstitutional.70 After Justice Gorsuch voted in 
line with Justice Thomas in a campaign finance case,71 election law expert 
Professor Richard Hasen speculated that Justice Gorsuch could be “as 
conservative as Justice Thomas is in these cases.”72 Justice Gorsuch’s vote with 
Justice Thomas may indicate a shared view on campaign finance laws, including 
disclosure laws. Justice Kavanaugh also expressed some hostility towards 
campaign finance disclosure laws. In Independence Institute v. FEC, then Judge 
Kavanaugh held that a 501(c)(3) organization’s complaint arguing that portions 
of BCRA disclosure laws were unconstitutional contained enough merit to be 
entitled to a three-judge tribunal.73 Justice Kavanugh’s decision reveals a belief 
that at least some application of campaign finance disclosure laws may be 
unconstitutional. However, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh’s 
appointments provide another wrinkle. Both of the newly appointed Justices 
have expressed opposition to Chevron deference.74 Thus, Crossroads’s stronger 
argument—ambiguity in the statute—may fall on deaf ears.75  
In response to CREW I, the FEC issued a press release on October 14, 2018, 
providing guidance for future quarterly reports.76 All contributions received 
 
 70. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 480 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).   
 71. Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017).  
 72. Paul Blumenthal, Neil Gorsuch Shows His Hand on Money in Politics As Court Turns Down Big Case, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 22, 2017, 1:38 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/neil-gorsuch-campaign-
finance_n_59231990e4b034684b0e7c63 (interviewing campaign finance expert Richard Hasen). 
 73. Indep. Inst. v. FEC, 816 F.3d 113, 115–16 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 74. Pema Levy, How Brett Kavanaugh Could Cripple the Next Democratic President, MOTHER JONES 
(July 24, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/07/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-chevron-
deference/ (excepting portions of Justice Kavanaugh’s speech at the University of Notre Dame regarding the 
Chevron doctrine); Eric Citron, The Roots and Limits of Gorsuch’s Views on Chevron Deference, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Mar. 17, 2017, 11:26 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/roots-limits-gorsuchs-views-chevron-
deference/.  
 75. Policy arguments would be a substantial factor in the Court’s analysis. Crossroads would likely argue 
that disclosure requirements unduly injure the First Amendment rights of 501(c) non-political organizations. 
Specifically, Crossroads may compare itself to the petitioner in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, who 
suffered a First Amendment injury when Ohio prohibited her from anonymously distributing leaflets to oppose 
a ballot proposition. 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995). In McIntyre, the Court held that the “interest in having 
anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring 
disclosure as a condition of entry.” Id. at 342. The Court held that Ohio’s interest in preventing libel and fraud 
was unfounded because ballot propositions do not present a substantial risk of libel or fraud. Id. at 351–52. Since 
Ohio could not demonstrate a sufficient state interest, the Court struck down Ohio’s disclosure law. Id. at 353, 
357. Crossroads’s reliance on McIntyre would be misplaced. Unlike the facts in McIntyre, Crossroads and other 
501(c) organizations make independent expenditures with the purpose of influencing elections. See FEC MUR 
6596 (Crossroads GPS), supra note 64. As McIntyre demonstrates, the government has a much stronger 
informational interest in the context of elections as opposed to ballot referendums—the risk of quid pro quo 
corruption is much higher in an election than an initiative or referendum. 514 U.S. at 356. Thus, it is unlikely 
that Crossroads’s policy argument will persuade the Court since independent expenditures exist for the purpose 
of influencing elections as opposed to influencing initiatives. 
 76. Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Provides Guidance Following U.S. District Court Decision 
in CREW v. FEC, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018) (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-provides-
guidance-following-us-district-court-decision-crew-v-fec-316-f-supp-3d-349-ddc-2018/.  
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between August 4 and September 18 require a disclosure including the identity 
of the person who made any contributions in excess of $250 and who did so with 
the purpose of furthering any independent expenditure.77  
Returning to the facts in the aforementioned hypothetical, under this 
policy, AFAM would be required to disclose the identity of its pharmaceutical 
company contributor because the pharmaceutical company contributed with the 
purpose of helping John get elected. Theoretically, this helps eliminate 
disingenuous 501(c) organizations that are created solely for the purpose of 
helping candidates get elected without disclosing the identities of the candidate’s 
financial supporters. While CREW I is an important step towards eliminating 
dark money in elections, as I will discuss next, it stops short of a robust 
transparency directive. 
B. THE AFTERMATH OF CREW I  
As discussed, CREW I makes it difficult for 501(c) organizations to spend 
money on independent expenditures without disclosing their donors’ identities. 
Campaign finance advocates, including FEC Commissioner Ellen Weintraub, 
praised the decision stating, “[t]his is a real victory for transparency. As a result, 
the American people will be better informed about who’s paying for the ads 
they’re seeing this election season.”78 Still, some argue that CREW I falls short 
of illuminating dark money donors by pointing to disclosure loophole scheme 
like the 501(c) shell game.79 The following subpart demonstrates that the 
commentators are only partially correct because dark money groups cannot use 
the 501(c) shell game to hide their identities after CREW I.  
 While CREW I compels 501(c) organizations to disclose the identity of its 
donors who help contribute and fund any independent expenditure, the 
aforementioned commentators believe that CREW I does not apply to a 501(c) 
contributing to another 501(c) or super PAC—also known as the 501(c) shell 
game.80 Take the Center to Protect Patient Rights. From 2008 to 2012, the Center 
to Protect Patient Rights, a conservative 501(c)(4) organization, spent 
$94,631,765 in grants to political organizations.81 One such grant included a $4 
 
 77. Id.  
 78. Dave Levinthal & Sarah Kleiner, “Dark Money” in Politics Is About to Get Lighter, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2018/09/18/22264/dark-money-politics-about-get-
lighter.  
 79. See Rick Hasen, Just How Much Will the Crossroads Ruling Change Disclosure Rules for 2018? 
Probably Not as Much as You Think, ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 20, 2018, 7:28 AM), 
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=101234 (arguing that dark money groups can still run issue advertisements and 
funnel money through 501(c) organizations in order to remain anonymous); Tim L. Peckinpaugh, et al., supra 
note 69; Trevor Potter, Opinion, Supreme Court Leaves in Place Decision that Will Shine a Light on Dark 
Money, HILL (Sept. 21, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/407795-supreme-court-leaves-in-
place-decision-that-will-shine-a-light-on-dark (noting that neither Congress nor the FEC have required 
disclosures for all electioneering communications).  
 80. See sources cited supra note 79. 
 81. Follow the Shadow of Dark Money, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/shadow-
infographic.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).  
GUALCO-NELSON-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:46 PM 
May 2020] CLOSING DISCLOSURE LOOPHOLES 1193 
million grant to another conservative 501(c)(4) organization, Americans for Tax 
Reform.82 Americans for Tax Reform, an “educational” tax organization, spent 
$15.8 million on independent expenditures throughout the 2012 election cycle.83 
Commentators suggest that the Center to Protect Patient Rights could arguably 
protect the identities of its donors, as long as it does not spend money directly 
on independent expenditures, and instead donates to super PACs or other 
organization who would create the independent expenditures.  
 Contrary to the commentators’ belief, CREW I prevents dark money donors 
from hiding their identities by laundering their contributions through a 501(c) to 
a super PAC or 501(c) organization. Rather than relying on who uses the money 
for the independent expenditure (such as a super PAC or 501(c)), CREW I relies 
on the donor’s intent to trigger a disclosure requirement. So long as “the 
contributions were made for political purposes to influence any election,” the 
501(c) must disclose the donor’s identity.84 CREW I bars the 501(c) shell game 
in the context of independent expenditures. The court came to this conclusion 
after reviewing Subsection 30104(c)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 
which states “[e]very person . . . who makes independent expenditures in an 
aggregate amount or value in excess of $250 during a calendar year shall file a 
statement containing the information required under subsection (b)(3)(A) for all 
contributions received by such person.”85 Subsection 30104(b)(3)(A) states that 
each report must disclose:  
[T]he identification of each . . . person . . . who makes a contribution to the 
reporting committee during the reporting period, whose contribution or 
contributions have an aggregate amount or value in excess of $200 within 
the calendar year . . . or in any lesser amount if the reporting committee 
should so elect, together with the date and amount of any such contribution.86 
The D.C. District Court concluded that Subsection 30104(c)(1) encompasses 
contributions by individuals or groups to a 501(c) that are then routed to 
organizations such as super PACs.87 The court explicitly stated that “subsection 
(c)(1) covers contributions used for other political purposes in support or 
opposition to federal candidates by the [501(c)] organization for contributions 
directly to . . . super PACs.”88 Thus, dark money donors cannot hide their 
identities by laundering their contributions through a 501(c) to a super PAC or 
501(c) organization.  
CREW I determined that FECA precludes the 501(c) shell game when the 
donor’s goal is to influence a federal election.89 Commentators argue that the 
 
 82. Michelle Merlin, Dick Morris’ Super PAC Spends $1.7 M on Conservative Website, OPENSECRETS 
(Dec. 7, 2012), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/12/super-pac-for-america/.  
 83. Id.  
 84. CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 423 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 85. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1) (2018). 
 86. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3) (emphasis added).  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 392.  
 89. Id.  
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district court’s decision does not cover two additional loopholes commonly used 
to avoid campaign finance disclosure requirements.90 First, commentators note 
that a 501(c) organization does not have to disclose a donation that is used for 
the purpose of advocating a specific issue (issue advocacy), as opposed to 
influencing an election (express advocacy).91 The CREW I court speculated in 
dicta that a 501(c) organization may not be required to disclose issue advocacy 
contributions, “[d]onations to [501(c)s] . . . may also be used to engage in issue 
advocacy, as opposed to express advocacy. Donors for issue advocacy may not 
need to be disclosed.”92 Second, commentators believe that donors can 
circumvent CREW I by funneling their money from an LLC into a 501(c) 
because it is almost impossible to figure out who created and financed the LLC.93 
This loophole is often called the “straw-donor” loophole.94 While CREW I did 
not directly address this loophole, the D.C. Circuit recently held that such 
corporations and LLCs are subject to the prohibition against straw donors.95 But 
the D.C. Circuit did not compel the FEC to immediately enforce the prohibition 
on the subject corporation because it was “‘an issue of first impression’ in light 
of the Citizens United and SpeechNow rulings . . . .”96 The straw-donor loophole 
serves as another example of the FEC’s unwillingness to promote transparency 
in campaign finance.  
II.  501(C)S IN ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS AND ISSUE ADVOCACY  
CREW I does not address 501(c) disclosure requirements in the context of 
issue advocacy; in fact, the court intentionally left that issue open.97 Today, 
many commentators argue that 501(c)s will avoid disclosure requirements by 
using precise language that avoids triggering independent expenditure or 
electioneering communication laws.98 Moreover, while FEC regulations address 
electioneering communications distributed via broadcast, cable, or satellite 
channels, the FEC has not addressed electioneering communications on the 
internet. The FEC recently took steps to require disclaimers on internet 
 
 90. See, e.g., Follow the Shadow of Dark Money, supra note 81; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Political Nonprofits 
Seek Answers After Court Decision Targeting “Dark Money,” WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2018, 3:14 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/political-nonprofits-seek-answers-after-court-decision-targeting-
dark-money/2018/09/21/444692f6-bd3f-11e8-8792-78719177250f_story.html?utm_term=.2ebe669dfa79. 
 91. See Follow the Shadow of Dark Money, supra note 81.  
 92. CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 423 n.38 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 93. Lee, supra note 90. 
 94. See, e.g., Jordan Muller, Here’s What You Need to Know About Shell Companies and Foreign Election 
spending, OPENSECRETS (June 28, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/06/shell-companies-foreign-
election-spending/. 
 95. Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“The controlling commissioners did not 
dispute that § 30122 applies to closely held corporations and corporate LLCs. We agree that it does.” (citation 
omitted)).  
 96. Id. (citation omitted).   
 97. CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 423 n.38.  
 98. See Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Shining a Light on ‘Dark Money’ and Online Ad Spending, OPENSECRETS 
(Mar. 14, 2019, 11:53 AM) https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/03/shining-a-light-on-dark-money-ssw/.  
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advertisements, but it has not proposed a rule requiring disclosures for internet 
advertisements.99 Since PACs and super PACs must disclose the identities of 
their donors, a disclaimer requirement will help direct viewers to these 
organizations’ disclosure statements that identify individual donors supporting 
online electioneering communications.100 However, the same cannot be said for 
a 501(c) organization because, as discussed earlier, it is not subject to disclosure 
requirements unless it is for an independent expenditure.101 The FEC should 
expand the definition of electioneering communications to include internet 
advertisements, thereby requiring disclosures for all internet-based 
advertisements, not just independent expenditures.102 
A. 501(C) PROBLEM IN ISSUE ADVOCACY 
CREW I does not address internet disclosure loopholes that, when coupled 
with the 501(c) problem, threaten electoral transparency. In order to understand 
how internet disclosures laws threaten electoral transparency, it’s worth pausing 
to provide context on the differences between issue vs. express advocacy, and 
electioneering communications versus independent expenditures.  
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court distinguished issue advocacy and express 
advocacy.103 Express advocacy is defined as expenditures for “the advocacy of 
the election nor defeat of candidates for federal offices,”104 whereas issue 
advocacy comprises “expenditures not containing explicit words urging action 
in the election.”105 The Court concluded that Congress could not regulate issue 
advocacy in the same way it regulates express (campaign) advocacy because it 
would result in an impermissible burden on First Amendment rights.106 But 
twenty-seven years later the Court abandoned this distinction in McConnell v. 
FEC, holding that Buckley did not prohibit Congress from regulating issue 
advocacy the same as express advocacy.107 In McConnell, the Court considered 
the constitutionality of the BCRA, which imposed disclosure requirements for 
 
 99. See Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public Communication,” 83 Fed. Reg. 
12864 (proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 110, 111 (2020)). A disclaimer often appears on the 
bottom of an advertisement and states who paid for the advertisement. A disclosure is made to the governing 
agency—the FEC—and states who paid for the advertisement. In other words, disclaimers appear on 
advertisements, while disclosures do not.  
 100. 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4) (2020); 11 CFR § 104.20(b). 
 101. 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4); 11 CFR § 104.20(b). 
 102. States Expand Definition of Electioneering Communications to Guard Against Corruption, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 7, 2013) (explaining that states, unlike the federal government, have taken steps to 
expand the definition of “electioneering communications” to include internet advertisements). 
 103. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976) 
 104. Id. at 205–06. 
 105. See Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and 
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 267 (2000) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
43–44). 
 106. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79–80. 
 107. 540 U.S. 93, 190, 194 (2003). 
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“electioneering communications.”108 BCRA’s disclosure provision regulates 
electioneering communications, which encompasses some forms of issue 
advocacy.109 Electioneering communications include any broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication.110 BCRA requires the disclosure of contributions for 
electioneering communications, which are advertisements that clearly identify 
an electoral candidate within sixty days before a general election and thirty days 
before a primary election.111 Congress enacted the electioneering 
communication provision because organizations exploited the Buckley issue 
versus express advocacy distinction, creating advertisements that were 
essentially express advocacy but lacked the “magic words” required by Buckley 
to be categorized as such.112 Thus, in McDonnell, the Court concluded that 
Congress could enact a provision, like the electioneering communications 
provision, to regulate forms of issue advocacy.113  
Citizens United affirmed McConnell when it rejected the argument that 
“disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy.”114 Yet, organizations can bypass the BCRA’s 
requirements by running advertisements outside the thirty- or sixty-day time 
frame or by not clearly identifying a candidate. But there’s another glaring 
exemption these organizations can exploit that neither the FEC nor BCRA 
cover—the internet. 
As of now, neither the FEC’s regulations nor the BCRA include internet 
advertisements within their definitions of electioneering communications.115 
This means that organizations like 501(c)s and super PACs are not subject to 
disclosure or disclaimer requirements if they circulate their electioneering 
communication on the internet.116 Because organizations are not subject to 
disclaimer requirements for internet advertisements, it is difficult for interested 
parties to determine who or what funded a particular internet advertisement. At 
 
 108. Id. at 194–95. Electioneering communications are distinguishable from independent expenditures in 
that independent expenditures require “an expenditure by a person . . . expressly advocating the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17) (2018).  
 109. See Carrie E. Miller, Parting the Dark Money Sea: Exposing Politically Active Tax-Exempt Groups 
Through FEC-IRS Hybrid Enforcement, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 351 (2015).  
 110. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1) (2018).  
 111. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3).  
 112. See States Expand Definition of Electioneering Communications to Guard Against Corruption, supra 
note 102. 
 113. 540 U.S. at 190, 194. 
 114. 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010). 
 115. See Matt Corley, Is Big-Spending Non-Profit One Nation Exploiting the Online Ad Loophole?, 
CITIZENS FOR RESP. & ETHICS IN WASH. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.citizensforethics.org/big-spending-non-
profit-one-nation-exploiting-online-ad-loophole/; Megan Janetsky, Low Transparency, Low Regulation Online 
Political Ads Skyrocket, OPENSECRETS (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/03/low-
transparency-low-regulation-online-political-ads-skyrocket/; Public Hearings on Internet Disclaimers, FED. 
ELECTION COMM’N (July 18, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/updates/public-hearing-internet-disclaimers-2018/.  
 116. Peter Overby, Federal Election Commission Might Make Disclaimers Mandatory for Online Political 
Ads, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 28, 2018, 4:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/28/624416612/federal-
election-commission-might-make-disclaimers-mandatory-for-online-politica. 
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least super PACs and political committees must disclose the identities of all their 
donors (as long as they contribute more than $200), so while a person may not 
know an advertisement’s creator or its contributors, that person will know the 
identity of a super PAC or political committee’s donors.117 But, again, 501(c) 
organizations are not required to disclose these donors.118 Therefore, unlike 
disclosure requirements for independent expenditures, which require a 
disclosure for any contributions made to influence an election, online issue 
advocacy messages do not fall within electioneering communications’ 
disclosure requirements.119  
Returning to the example in Part I, after CREW I, AFAM can no longer 
hide the identity of its donors that want to expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of Jane Node. But imagine that instead of creating independent 
expenditure advertisements, AFAM’s donors contribute for the purpose of 
“persuading voters to change Jane Node’s stance on the Affordable Care Act.” 
The election is twenty-nine days away and AFAM wants to roll out 
advertisements that clearly identify Jane Node. Under subsection 30104(f), 
AFAM cannot hide its donors’ identities because its advertisements will clearly 
identify Jane Node within thirty days of the election.120 However, subsection 
30104(f) only applies to “broadcast, cable, or satellite” communications.121 
AFAM can create an internet advertisement that states, “Tell Jane Node that the 
Affordable Care Act is not what the public wants,” and, unlike a super PAC or 
political committee, a 501(c)(4) does not have to disclose its source of funding 
unless it falls within 30104(c)’s independent expenditure requirements.  
To improve transparency, the FEC must close this internet loophole—
particularly given the IRS’s recent decision to eliminate its own disclosure 
regulations.122 Up until recently, the FEC required 501(c) organizations to 
provide the IRS with the identity of any donor who donated $5000 or more on 
the 501(c) organizations’ tax returns.123 Although the IRS redacted the donors’ 
identities, the agency, on several occasions, failed to redact all the names.124 The 
possibility of a failed redaction arguably deterred large donors from donating to 
dark money groups. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin responded to this 
anxiety in July 2018 by eliminating this disclosure requirement for 501(c)(4) and 
501(c)(6) organizations.125 Secretary Mnuchin stated that the decision 
constitutes “significant reform to protect personal information.”126 However, the 
 
 117. 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4) (2020); 11 CFR § 104.20(b). 
 118. See supra Part I. 
 119. See Levinthal & Kleiner, supra note 78.  
 120. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f) (2018); 11 CFR § 100.29 (2020). 
 121. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f). 
 122. Peter Overby, Dark Money Groups Get a Little Darker, Thanks to IRS, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 17, 
2018, 4:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/17/629823953/dark-money-groups-get-a-little-darker-thanks-to-
irs. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
GUALCO-NELSON-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:46 PM 
1198 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1181 
Secretary’s decision emboldens 501(c) organizations. In 2014, internet 
advertisements made up less than 1% ($71 million) of political ad spending.127 
By the 2018 midterms digital advertising increased to $600 million.128 If the IRS 
no longer requires 501(c)(4) disclosures, it behooves the FEC to step in and 
institute a regulation requiring disclosures.  
B. SOLVING THE 501(C) INTERNET LOOPHOLE  
The internet loophole may not survive much longer. On March 26, 2018, 
the FEC published a notice of proposed rulemaking.129 The proposed rule would 
require internet advertisements to contain a disclaimer that identified the 
advertisement’s creator.130 Disclaimers are different from disclosures. 
Disclaimers provide the identity of the advertisement’s major donors on the 
actual advertisement; whereas disclosures are publicly submitted to the 
supervising agency, the FEC, but and are not listed on the actual advertisement. 
While the FEC’s proposed rule does not include disclosures, it symbolizes a shift 
in the FEC’s focus to internet-based political activity. In fact, the FEC created a 
new term called “public communications” that encompasses “communications 
placed for a fee on another person’s website.”131 By implementing this proposed 
rule, the FEC acknowledges the importance of political transparency on the 
internet.  
The FEC can close the internet loophole by adopting a regulation that 
expands the definition of “electioneering communication” to include its newly 
proposed term “public communications.”132 The FEC’s current regulatory 
proposal defines “public communications” as, “a communication by means of 
any . . . general public political advertising. . . . [t]he term general public 
political advertising shall not include communications over the Internet, except 
for the communications placed for a fee on another person’s Web site.”133 
Congress gave the FEC the authority to make or amend rules as “necessary to 
carry out the provisions” of Congress’s statute.134 The FEC should amend its 
electioneering communication definition to state: “Electioneering 
communication means any broadcast, cable, satellite or public communication 
 
 127. Janetsky, supra note 115. 
 128. 2018 Political Digital Advertising Report, TECH FOR CAMPAIGNS, https://www.techforcampaigns.org/ 
2018-political-digital-advertising-report (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). There are a couple of important and 
interesting things to note about this source. First, it only sampled sixty campaigns in the election cycle to 
conclude that these campaigns spent $600 million on digital advertising, which suggests that the amounts are 
much higher. Id. Second, over 90% of political advertisements were delivered to mobile phones rather than 
desktop devices. Id. 
 129. Public Hearing on Internet Disclaimers, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (July 18, 2018), 
https://www.fec.gov/updates/public-hearing-internet-disclaimers-2018/.  
 130. Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public Communication,” 83 Fed. Reg. 12864 
(proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 110, 111 (2020)). 
 131. For a current definition, see 11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (2020).  
 132. Public Hearing on Internet Disclaimers, supra note 129. 
 133. 11 C.F.R. § 100.26. 
 134. 52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(8) (2018).  
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as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 100.26.” By ratifying this new definition, all public 
communications, including paid internet activity, will be subject to the same 
disclosure laws as electioneering communications. Since electioneering 
communication disclosure requirements force all persons, including 501(c)s, to 
disclose the identity of their contributors, 501(c) donors would be subject to the 
spotlight. Utilizing this pathway, the FEC could eliminate the possibility of an 
internet loophole for electioneering communications.  
III.  THE LLC TO 501(C) STRAW-DONOR INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE 
LOOPHOLE  
The commentators who claimed that CREW I would not completely 
eliminate dark money in elections were not entirely wrong.135 During the 2016 
presidential election, Donald Trump’s political committee raised $10.6 million 
from LLCs.136 Individuals set up these LLCs to hide their identity.137 
Theoretically, a foreign agent could set up an LLC, incorporate it in Delaware, 
and make contributions to super PACs and political committees without the 
public learning that the money came from a foreign source.138 FECA permits the 
FEC to investigate these “straw-donor” violations, but the commission often 
fails to garner enough votes to commence an investigation.139 In order to compel 
the FEC to investigate straw-donor violations, courts must conclude that the 
FEC’s decision not to investigate an alleged straw-donor violation was contrary 
to law.140  
A. CREATING A SHELL LLC TO PROTECT THE DONOR’S IDENTITY 
 Delaware’s corporate law protects the identity of an LLC founder or 
managing member.141 Many individuals use LLCs as shells to contribute to super 
PACs and 501(c) organizations.142 Some non-profits, like the Campaign Legal 
Center (CLC), promote political transparency by filing complaints with the FEC 
 
 135. See sources cited supra note 79.  
 136. Ashley Balcerzak, Surge in LLC Contributions Brings More Mystery About True Donors, 
OPENSECRETS (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/04/surge-in-llc-contributions-more-
mystery/.   
 137. Id.  
 138. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York indicted Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman 
for this precise type of straw-donor scheme. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Lev 
Parnas and Igor Fruman Charged with Conspiring to Violate Straw and Foreign Donor Bans (Oct. 10, 2019) 
[hereinafter Parnas and Frugman Indictment], https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/lev-parnas-and-igor-
fruman-charged-conspiring-violate-straw-and-foreign-donor-bans.  
 139. See, e.g., Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 312 F. Supp. 3d 153, 153 (D.D.C. 2017).  
 140. Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 141. Libby Watson, Why Are There so Many Anonymous Companies in Delaware?, SUNLIGHT FOUND. 
(Apr. 6, 2016, 12:59 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/04/06/why-are-there-so-many-anonymous-
corporations-in-delaware/.  
 142. See Rebecca Ballhaus, New Path for Masking PAC Donors, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2016, 11:48 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-path-for-masking-super-pac-donors-1454546712; see also Parnas and 
Frugman Indictment, supra note 138. 
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alleging that anonymous donors use LLCs to circumvent disclosure 
requirements.143 These situations are known as “straw-donor” cases, and are 
illegal under FECA.144 However, up until Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 
21 v. FEC (“Democracy 21”),145 courts have historically applied the straw-donor 
statutory provisions to individuals who make donations in the name of another 
individual, not LLCs.146 FECA prohibits individuals from using someone else’s 
name to donate to a political campaign.147 FECA also prohibits the recipient 
from accepting a donation that they know is from a different individual.148 If an 
LLC donates to a super PAC or 501(c) organization for the purpose of 
influencing an election, the super PAC or 501(c) can only disclose the name of 
the LLC because states like Delaware protect the identities of the individuals 
behind the LLC.149 Therefore, individual donors can hide their identities by 
laundering their donations through a shell LLC.  
Circling back to the example in Part I, imagine a donor wants to create an 
independent expenditure that denounces Jane Node, but the donor does not want 
their name on the advertisement. After learning about the recent CREW I 
decision, the donor decides to funnel their money through a shell LLC to a super 
PAC. The donor creates “Accountability LLC” and leaves $1 million in its 
general treasury fund. Accountability LLC then donates a large sum to AFAM’s 
sister super PAC, Citizens Against Archaic Medicine (CAAM). In accordance 
with FECA and the FEC’s regulations, CAAM discloses that Accountability 
LLC donated a large sum, but CAAM does not disclose the wealthy donor’s 
name. The donor achieved their goal of anonymously spreading their message. 
Thus, the FEC and public only know that Accountability LLC made the 
donation, not the actual identity of the human donor.  
B. COMPELLING THE FEC TO INVESTIGATE STRAW-DONOR VIOLATIONS 
Under FECA, the FEC has the authority to investigate and determine if an 
individual violated FECA’s straw-donor laws.150 Many commentators criticize 
the FEC for routinely failing to probe straw-donor complaints due to political 
 
 143. CLC v. FEC (Straw Donors), CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., https://campaignlegal.org/ 
cases-actions/clc-v-fec-straw-donor (last updated June 6, 2018).  
 144. Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Alex Glorioso, An FEC Warning on LLC 
Gifts to Super PACs?, OPENSECRETS (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/04/an-fec-
warning-on-llc-gifts-to-super-pacs/ (citing the statements from commissioners stating that “closely held 
corporations and corporate LLCs may be considered straw donors” in violation of the law).   
 145. 952 F.3d 352 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 146. 52 U.S.C. § 30122 (2018); see United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015); 
Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 119, 129 (D.D.C. 2017) (arguing in favor of treating shell LLCs 
as straw donors). 
 147. 52 U.S.C. § 30122. 
 148. Id.  
 149. See Watson, supra note 141. But see Peter J. Henning, Is This the End of the Anonymous Shell 
Companies? Not Too Fast, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/business/ 
dealbook/llc-shell-companies-money-laundering.html. 
 150. 52 U.S.C. § 30122. 
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deadlock.151 Until recently, the FEC has never initiated an enforcement action 
in response to a complaint alleging that someone is using an LLC as a straw 
donor,152 despite the Department of Justice’s belief that an LLC can be used as 
a straw donor.153 On March 13, 2020, the D.C. Circuit concluded that 
corporations are subject to FECA’s straw-donor prohibition. 
In 2016, CLC filed a complaint with the FEC alleging that Richard 
Stephenson, a wealthy investment banker, in tandem with two other people, 
made more than $12 million in contributions to a super PAC called Freedom 
Works for America.154 The FEC’s general counsel recommended that the FEC 
investigate the case.155 Instead of deferring to the FEC’s general counsel, three 
members of the FEC concluded that the agency should not investigate the 
complaint.156 Since the remaining commissioners could not get the necessary 
four votes to order an investigation, the FEC closed CLC’s case.157 Once again, 
the FEC deadlocked on partisan grounds—seemingly never-ending pattern in 
which Democrat appointees vote with fellow Democrat and Republican 
appointees vote with fellow Republicans.158  
In response to the deadlock, CLC sued, arguing that FECA entitles the 
public to election-related information.159 The FEC filed a motion to dismiss on 
the theory that CLC had not suffered an injury.160 The district court disagreed, 
concluding that FECA gives CLC the right to “truthful information regarding 
campaign contributions and expenditures.”161 Thus, the FEC’s motion to dismiss 
failed because a failure to provide information satisfies the “particularized 
injury” requirement of standing.162 
Campaign Legal Center provides two significant takeaways. First, courts 
can still actively compel the FEC to investigate disclosure violations. In a 
subsequent decision, the D.C. District gave CLC the opportunity to demonstrate 
that the FEC’s decision to preclude straw-donor violation investigations 
constituted arbitrary and capricious conduct that is contrary to FECA.163 While 
the court ultimately held that the FEC’s decision did not amount to conduct that 
was contrary to law,164 the court’s refusal to dismiss the claim for lack of injury 
 
 151. See Anthony J. Gaughan, Trump, Twitter, and the Russians: The Growing Obsolescence of Federal 
Campaign Finance Law, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 79, 112 (2017).  
 152. See Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 312 F. Supp. 3d 153, 158 (D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted). 
 153. See, e.g., Parnas and Frugman Indictment, supra note 138. 
 154. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 119, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2017).  
 155. Id. at 127.  
 156. Id. at 123.  
 157. Id.  
 158. In fact, a recent investigation determined that Democrat appointees voted together 87% of the time, 
while Republican appointees voted as a bloc 98% of the time. Thompson, supra note 9. 
 159. Campaign Legal Ctr., 245 F. Supp. 3d at 123.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting All. for Democracy v. FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 138, 
144 (D.D.C. 2005)). 
 162. Id. at 129.  
 163. See, e.g., Campaign Legal Ctr., 312 F. Supp. 3d at 161. 
 164. Id. at 161.   
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demonstrates the court’s understanding that LLC straw-donor schemes can 
cause an injury to the public. This case provides a roadmap to organizations like 
CLC to engage the FEC on the merits of these disputes—a costly endeavor that 
may prompt an agency to settle and provide some amount of information rather 
than spend time and money in court.  
Second, and more generally, both CREW I and Campaign Legal Center 
demonstrate that the FEC will consistently fail to address dark money issues. 
The FEC’s partisan gridlock makes it an inefficient government agency, 
especially since, at the time of this publication, only three of six seats are 
filled.165 Four are needed in order to have a quorum.166 In 2016, former 
Commissioner Ann Ravel resigned from the FEC and explained she did so, in 
part, because of the FEC’s absolute failure to address dark money issues.167 In 
her resignation letter, former Commissioner Ravel admonished the FEC stating, 
“Disclosure laws need to be strengthened . . . and Commissioners who will carry 
out the mandates of the law should be appointed to the expired terms at the 
FEC.”168 If the FEC keeps failing to carry out its statutory mandate, it will be up 
to the courts to use administrative law doctrines to correct the agency’s failures.  
But within the D.C. Circuit, the courts are split as to whether they must 
review the FEC’s decision. In CREW II, the majority balked at the suggestion 
that the judiciary should interfere and/or overrule the FEC’s prosecutorial 
discretion.169 “[I]f an action is committed to the agency’s discretion under 
APA § 701(a)(2)—as agency enforcement decisions are—there can be no 
judicial review for abuse of discretion, or otherwise.”170 This remains a 
contested decision amongst D.C. Circuit judges. Recently, in Democracy 21, 
Judge Edwards echoed Judge Pillard’s dissent in Crew II by rebuking the idea 
that courts could not review exercises of the FEC’s prosecutorial discretion.171 
Judge Edwards acknowledged that exercises of prosecutorial discretion are 
typically unreviewable, per the Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 
but raised the Court’s caveat in FEC v. Atkins.172 In Atkins the Court also 
recognized that exercises of prosecutorial discretion are unreviewable, but 
concluded that “[FECA] explicitly indicates the contrary. . . . [Respondents] 
may bring this petition for a declaration that the FEC’s dismissal of their 
 
 165. Shane Goldmacher, The Federal Election Commission Needs 4 of 6 Members to Enforce the Law. It 
Now Has 3, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/us/politics/federal-election-
commission.html. 
 166. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (2018). 
 167. Ann Ravel, Departing the Federal Election Commission, MEDIUM (Feb. 19, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@AnnMRavel/departing-the-federal-election-commission-fee0ae9d63a1 (quoting from 
former Commissioner Ravel’s resignation letter to President Donald Trump). 
 168. Id.  
 169. See generally CREW II, 892 F.3d 434, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that the courts cannot review the 
FEC’s decision not to investigate a potential campaign finance violation if the FEC’s decision rests on the basis 
of prosecutorial discretion).  
 170. Id. at 441. 
 171. Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Edwards, J., concurring).  
 172. Id. at 360–61. 
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complaint was unlawful.”173 To conclude otherwise would enable the FEC to 
use “prosecutorial discretion” as a pretextual talisman to drive away 
inconvenient judicial review. FECA even contains a provision authorizing 
judicial review. Also known as the citizen-suit provision, 52 
U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) states that a district court:  
In any proceeding under this paragraph the court may declare that the 
dismissal of the complaint or the failure to act is contrary to law, and may 
direct the Commission to conform with such declaration within 30 days, 
failing which the complainant may bring, in the name of such complainant, 
a civil action to remedy the violation involved in the original complaint.174  
This provision suggests that Congress implicitly authorized courts to review an 
agency’s decision not to undertake an enforcement action even if its decision 
was based on an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. If the court determines that 
the FEC’s decision was contrary to law, then it will give the FEC a chance to 
conform its decision to the law before authorizing a private citizen to file a 
private right of action. Until recently the courts had never permitted a citizen 
suit since FECA’s passage in 1976.175 
In CREW v. American Action Network (AAN), the D.C. District Court held 
that CREW could proceed with their citizen suit against AAN.176 A citizen-suit 
is permissible if the FEC fails to abide by a court order finding a dismissal of a 
complaint “contrary to law” based on an erroneous interpretation of FECA.177 
CREW filed a complaint with the FEC claiming that AAN operated as an 
unregistered political committee.178 The FEC dismissed the complaint twice on 
the grounds that AAN had not violated FECA, and after each dismissal, the 
district court reversed and remanded to the FEC with instructions.179 Because 
the FEC repeatedly failed to comply with the court’s instructions, CREW filed 
a citizen-suit against AAN in the D.C. District Court, which circumvented the 
FEC’s review.180 AAN moved to dismiss CREW’s lawsuit, under the theory that 
the D.C. Circuit prohibited judicial review of the FEC’s prosecutorial 
discretion.181  
The court determined that the FEC’s rejection of CREW’s complaint was 
not an exercise of prosecutorial discretion because the FEC based its decision 
on an interpretation of FECA, which qualifies for judicial review.182 The court 
noted that the FEC’s occasional reference to prosecutorial discretion cannot 
 
 173. 524 U.S. 11, 26 (1998).  
 174. CREW II, 892 F.3d. at 437 (alterations in original) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) (2018)). 
 175. Kenneth P. Doyle, Watchdog Allowed to Sue on Donor Disclosure After FEC Won’t Act, BLOOMBERG 
GOV’T (Oct. 1, 2019), https://about.bgov.com/news/watchdog-allowed-to-sue-on-donor-disclosure-after-fec-
wont-act/. 
 176. No. 18-cv-945 (CRC), 2019 WL 4750248, at *1 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 177. Id. at *17.  
 178. Id. at *3. 
 179. Id. at *17. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. at *8–9.  
 182. Id. at *8–9.  
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outweigh an administrative opinion grounded almost solely in legal 
arguments—substance matters more than form.183 Because the FEC’s dismissals 
were based on legal arguments rather than prosecutorial discretion, the court 
could review the FEC’s decisions, remand with instructions, and, if the FEC did 
not abide by the instructions, permit CREW to file a citizen suit.184 
AAN is an important step toward political transparency. First, the court’s 
dissatisfaction with the FEC’s deadlock suggests that courts may, where 
possible, transfer some of the FEC’s authority to citizen-suits. This sentiment is 
reflected Judge Cooper’s glib remark that “[t]he Federal Election Commission 
is the only government agency that does exactly what Congress designed it to 
do: nothing.”185 Second, while a court’s authority to review decisions based on 
FEC prosecutorial discretion remains up-in-the-air, AAN reflects the courts’ 
ability to parse through the FEC’s pretextual use of prosecutorial discretion to 
bar judicial review. Third, AAN presents an opportunity for dissatisfied FEC 
Commissioners to circumvent partisan deadlock. AAN includes an analysis of 
the FEC’s genuine motivations for dismissing CREW’s complaint, rather than 
simply deferring to pretextual “prosecutorial discretion” justification.186 
Commissioners that have expressed dissatisfaction with their colleagues’ 
decision not to vote in favor of an enforcement action could sign on to these 
decisions and articulate legal, as opposed to discretionary, reasons for not 
initiating enforcement actions. Even under CREW II, the legal basis for rejecting 
an enforcement action would trigger the district court’s authority to review such 
decisions to ascertain (1) whether the FEC’s proclaimed discretionary reasons 
for not initiating an action are genuine, and (2) whether the FEC’s interpretation 
of FECA is contrary to law. The courts’ increased role in litigating FEC 
enforcement matters may prompt Congress to pass legislation to remove the 
FEC’s design defect and promote transparency in our elections.  
CONCLUSION 
Anonymous spending continues to permeate elections in the United States. 
Instead of combating dark money in federal elections, the FEC remains 
paralyzed and divided. The FEC also continues to misinterpret and misapply 
FECA’s mandate, demonstrated by the recent cases CREW I, Campaign Legal 
Center, and AAN. Two years after foreign intelligence reports demonstrated that 
foreign actors relied heavily on the internet in federal elections, the FEC 
proposed a rule to require disclaimers—but not disclosures—on digital political 
 
 183. Id. at *11. 
 184. Id. at *12. 
 185. Id. at *1. The court goes on to correct one thing that the quote mischaracterizes: Congress did not 
actually design the FEC to do nothing.  
 186. Id. at *11. 
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advertisements.187 The FEC’s proposed rule is a step in the right direction but 
does not go far enough.  
To combat dark money, the FEC must address internet disclosure loopholes 
and investigate straw-donor schemes. The FEC can address the internet 
disclosure loophole by promulgating a regulation that expands the definition of 
electioneering communications to include public communications. To combat 
straw-donor schemes, the solution is simpler. The FEC should investigate 
potential violations of 52 U.S.C. § 30122. It is unlikely that the FEC will address 
these issues in the near future—it does not even have enough commissioners for 
a quorum. The courts and transparency interest groups must hold the FEC 
accountable, even when the FEC asserts prosecutorial discretion as a basis for 
choosing not to authorize enforcement actions. CREW I, Campaign Legal 
Center, and AAN demonstrate that this remains a viable option.  
  
 
 187. Nicholas Fandos & Kevin Roose, Facebook Identifies an Active Political Influence Campaign Using 
Fake Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/facebook-
political-campaign-midterms.html. 
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